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THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER IN SPAIN: 
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF KEY GUIDING INDICATORS
This paper describes the overall characteristics of the Basel III countercyclical capital 
buffer (CCB) framework, its implementation in the EU, and analyses a group of potential 
guiding indicators for Spain. Based on an empirical exploratory analysis of three stress 
events identified, we describe a number of practical and conceptual issues that may arise 
with the Basel benchmark buffer guide – the credit-to-GDP gap – and study a number of 
complementary indicators. We explore specifically some alternative specifications for the 
credit-to-GDP gap and additional indicators of credit developments where we propose a 
‘credit intensity’ measure (the ratio of changes in credit to cumulated GDP). Further to this, 
we explore the performance of indicators of real estate property prices, external imbalances 
and private sector debt sustainability – including various transformations of the indicators 
when needed. In line with previous literature, we find that a broad but manageable set of 
indicators may help to improve decisions on the CCB.
 A number of macroprudential instruments have been proposed in the last few years. Most 
instruments thus far are based on banks’ balance sheets, build on microprudential 
standards and are usually classified as structural or cyclical (time-varying). Among the 
latter, the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) is perhaps the best known macroprudential 
instrument and one at a more advanced stage of operationalisation. Capital or liquidity 
requirements for systemic financial institutions are examples of structural instruments.1 
The CCB’s appearance in the international regulatory debate can be traced to the 2009 
consultative paper on “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS proposes in this paper a series of 
measures to address procyclicality with four key objectives: i) dampen any excess cyclicality 
of the minimum capital requirement; ii) promote more forward looking provisions; iii) conserve 
capital to build buffers that can be used in stress; and iv) achieve the broader macro-
prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth. 
The third and fourth objectives above served as a basis for the creation of a ‘conservation’ 
and a ‘countercyclical’ capital buffer, respectively.2 Subsequently, the Basel III framework 
introduced these two requirements together with an additional capital buffer or ‘capital 
surcharge’ for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The conservation, 
countercyclical and SIFIs buffers are all capital-based requirements. The numerator is 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and the denominator is Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs).3 
Regarding the selection of capital-based requirements, the BCBS (2010) paper provides 
long-term estimates of the expected economic benefits (reductions in the probability of 
banking crises and its output loss) and costs (decline in steady-state output) of introducing 
higher capital and liquidity requirements. 
1 Introduction
1  Given practical difficulties to disentangle pure time varying vs. pure structural instruments, macroprudential 
instruments are also commonly classified according to the source of risk that they address (eg: excessive credit 
growth, maturity mismatches and market liquidity, concentration). This is the approach followed for example in 
the ESRB 2013 Recommendation on intermediate objectives and instruments of macroprudencial policy.
2  Drehmann et al. (2010) study different options for the design of countercyclical capital buffers also drawing on 
the experience with dynamic provisions (ie: the general loan loss provisions applied in Spain since mid-2000). 
Saurina (2009a, 2009b) and Trucharte and Saurina (2013) describe the Spanish dynamic provisions in detail and 
discuss their use for macroprudential policy. 
3  BCBS (2011).
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The implementation of the three requirements will be phased-in from January 2016 
onwards, reaching their full effect in January 2019. Under these transitional arrangements 
the CCB can be activated at a maximum of 0.625% of RWAs from January 2016. After 
that, the maximum possible CCB level increases each year by 0.625 percentage points 
until reaching the level of 2.5% of RWAs on January 2019. National authorities can 
accelerate this period if their countries are experiencing excessive credit growth, and they 
can also choose to implement larger CCB requirements.4 Authorities opting to activate or 
increase the CCB should make public their decision in advance by up to 12 months in 
order to give banks time to adjust their capital levels. Decisions to fully release or decrease 
the CCB, on the contrary, take effect immediately.
In addition to the Basel III framework, the BCBS (2010) “Guidance on operating the CCB” 
– a CCB specific companion document to Basel III – provides further information how the 
buffer is expected to work. The BCBS paper clarifies in particular the key aim of the regime, 
namely ‘to ensure that the banking sector in aggregate has the capital on hand to help 
maintain the flow of credit in the economy without its solvency being questioned, when the 
broader financial system experiences stress after a period of excess credit growth’. The 
BCBS also sets out details for the calculations of a quantitative indicator – the credit-to-
GDP gap – to be used as a common starting point when setting the buffer rates. Finally, 
the BCBS document provides for a set of principles to guide authorities in the use of 
judgement when taking buffer decisions. 
Following the BCBS proposals, a number of countries have started to implement the CCB. In 
the EU, the new European legislation on banking regulation (CRR/CRDIV) introduces the CCB 
in Articles 130 and 135-140 of the CRDIV.5 In addition, Article 135 asks the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) to provide guidance on a number of operational issues for the implementation 
of the CCB in EU countries. Backed by empirical work presented in its 2014 Occasional Paper, 
the ESRB recommendation on “Guidance to EU Member States for setting countercyclical 
buffer rates” achieves this task.6, 7 The recommendation extends the Basel principles, assesses 
the adequacy of the Basel gap and benchmark rule to set buffer rates, and provides guidance 
on other indicators to signal the activation and deactivation of the buffer.
Using as a background the BCBS framework for the CCB, the aforementioned ESRB 
recommendation and the EU legislation on the subject, this paper takes a first step towards 
analysing the performance of a set of quantitative indicators to guide the CCB in Spain. In 
particular, we study a short-list of what we considered the more auspicious indicators 
following a pre-selection process drawing on relevant literature and ongoing experiences 
in other countries. 
In this exercise we focus on exploring the indicators informative value during those periods 
when systemic risks stemming from excessive credit growth are building up when the CCB 
is supposed to accumulate. Some tentative observations on the indicators potential ability 
4  In these cases, however, reciprocity arrangements are not mandatory where countries opt for additional amounts 
above 2.5% or earlier activations of the CCB.
5  CRR stands for Capital Requirements Regulation [i.e., Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012]. CRDIV stands for Capital Requirements Directive IV [i.e., Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms]. In Spain, Law 10/2014 of 26 
June, on the organization, supervision and solvency of credit institutions, transposes the provisions in the CRR/CRDIV.
6 Detken et al. (2014).
7 ESRB (2014a).
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to help guide the release of the CCB are made in a few cases, but a more comprehensive 
analysis on this area is left for future work. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the overall characteristics of the 
CCB regime in Basel III and the key elements from the ESRB recommendation on the CCB. 
Section 3 explains the crisis events in Spain that we used to explore the performance of a 
set of indicators or ‘sign posts’ to help guide buffer decisions. Section 4 describes the set 
of indicators selected and explores their ability to identify periods of excessive credit 
growth in Spain. Section 5 extracts conclusions from the empirical exercise performed.
The first thing that should be made clear-cut from the beginning is what the CCB is trying 
to achieve – and what it is not. Although its name may lead to different interpretations at 
first sight, the CCB’s key aim is a narrow but important one. As explained in the introduction, 
the CCB is meant to ensure that the banking sector as a whole has an extra capital buffer 
which could be used to absorb losses in a downturn preceded by a period of excessive 
credit growth associated with the build up of systemic risks. Thus, the CCB aims to 
contribute to the broader objective of increasing resilience in the banking system and, in 
this manner, help to sustain the supply of credit to the economy in bad times. 
The possible dampening of the build-up of excessive credit in boom times or the containment 
of exuberance are seen as potential positive side-effects but are not primary goals. In 
particular, the CCB has not been conceived as an instrument to manage economic cycles 
or asset prices. All the focus is on the credit cycle.8 And all the emphasis is on resilience.
For this purpose the CCB should be accumulated during expansionary periods so that it 
can then be released when the downturn hits, allowing the capital buffer to absorb losses. 
A credible and enforceable release of the CCB is therefore as important as its accumulation. 
Failing to use the buffer when the systemic risks it is targeting materialise would reduce the 
CCB’s effectiveness and increase procyclicality. Naturally, the release would only be 
possible if the CCB was correctly accumulated in anticipation to a downturn.
The countercyclical capital requirement is structured as an extension of the Basel conservation 
buffer. That is, both regulatory requirements have to be met jointly and are subject to the same 
conditions, eg: restrictions on dividend distributions during shortfalls. But whilst the minimum 
capital conservation buffer is constant, the minimum CCB level is allowed to vary over time. 
The CCB is also a broad-based requirement. Its scope of action is aggregate domestic 
credit. This implies that the CCB targets system-wide cyclical risks stemming from credit 
exposures in a given banking sector. Yet, as banks from a given system may also be 
participating in other systems abroad, the bank-specific CCB rate is calculated as the 
weighted average of the CCB rates that apply in those countries where the relevant credit 
exposures of the bank are located.9 Weights are given by the ratio of the capital requirements 
for credit risk in each country, divided by the bank’s total requirement for credit risk.
The decisional framework for the activation and release of the CCB (i.e., usage of the CCB) 
follows what is known as a ‘constrained’ or ‘guided discretion’ approach. This framework 
comprises a common standardised quantitative indicator to be used as a benchmark (the 
2  How does 
the CCB work? 
8  Related to this, Jiménez et al. (2013) provides empirical insights on the effects of countercyclical buffers on credit 
cycles both in good and in bad times.
9 EBA (2013).
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credit-to-GDP gap) and a set of principles to guide judgement when taking buffer decisions. 
Trade-offs between rules and discretion are long known in economics. Rules tend to boost 
predictability, avoid time-inconsistencies [Kydland and Prescott (1977)] and contribute to 
ensure transparency and accountability. But rules are also less flexible and adaptable 
to different environments or unexpected events. A guided discretion approach could be seen 
as a middle-ground solution between a rules-based and a discretion-based approach.10 
Regarding the credit-to-GDP gap (i.e., the baseline ‘Basel gap’ or, in regulatory jargon, the 
‘benchmark buffer guide’), it is also important to clarify upfront what is the expected role 
for this indicator in the Basel framework. As stated, the baseline gap is a benchmark or 
common starting point for the analysis and discussion on CCB levels. It is not an end point 
for the analysis. As such, the gap should serve as a basis to explain deviations from the 
baseline specification, the reasons why other indicators may work better in some countries, 
or why the gap may fail to explain and justify certain decisions in given circumstances. 
Since the Basel gap is a common benchmark, its components are standardised and its 
calculation and reporting are mandatory. In addition, there is a benchmark rule associated 
with the gap linking CCB levels with gap values. This provides a ‘guide’ to help decide 
when to activate or deactivate the CCB. And all this should also help to establish a common 
ground for discussions on the CCB. 
But the Basel gap is not necessarily the sole indicator that authorities should consider when 
taking and communicating decisions on the CCB. Other quantitative indicators can also be 
used. Nor is the gap the only source of information available to authorities. Qualitative 
information – for example from experts’ judgements – is also relevant. In addition, although 
a rule to map different gap values to CCB levels is also provided in the Basel framework, 
this is not a mechanical rule but rather a reference, as is the baseline gap itself.11 
On the principles guiding judgement – the first leg in the guided discretion approach for 
the CCB –, the BCBS has suggested five. The principles expand on the objective of the 
CCB, the role of the credit-to-GDP gap, the use of additional indicators – including those 
that may help to signal the release phase –, and on the possible use of other macroprudential 
instruments. They are reproduced in Appendix 1.
The ESRB recommendation on the CCB, in turn, also provides for a set of principles. The 
first five principles in the recommendation are largely based on the Basel principles. Slight 
adjustments are introduced to reflect some EU specificities and provide some further 
information on technical details. For example, to reflect the observation that, as may be 
expected in other contexts, the Basel gap in the EU tends to perform better in the build-
phase rather than in the release one. Moreover, having considered their importance for the 
effectiveness of the CCB, the ESRB recommendation introduces two new principles on 
communication and reciprocity. These two principles are included at the end of Appendix 1.
2.1 PRINCIPLES
10  For a discussion on rules vs. discretion in macroprudential policy see Libertucci and Quagliarello (2010).
11  This expected role for the baseline gap is already anticipated on page 70 of the BCBS (2010) “Guidance on 
operating the CCB”: ‘The proposal [on the CCB] under development could not be implemented as a strict rules-
based regime. Such an approach would require a high degree of confidence that the variables used would 
always, under all circumstances, perform as intended and would not send out false signals. This level of 
confidence will not be possible. Consequently, a benchmarking approach is being considered where the buffer 
generated is simply the starting point. The option will exist for authorities to increase or decrease the buffer as 
appropriate, taking into account the broader range of information which supervisors and central banks will be 
able to consider in the context of the circumstances which prevail at the time.’ The same reasoning is then 
further developed under Principle 2 (“common reference guide”) in the BCBS (2010) guiding document.
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All these principles set common boundaries within which judgement can play a role when 
deciding on the buffer.
The credit-to-GDP gap – the quantitative indicator proposed as the benchmark buffer 
guide for the CCB – is calculated as the ratio of credit-to-GDP minus its long-term trend 
using the statistical method described below. 
In line with the broad-based nature of the CCB, the credit metric for the numerator in 
credit-to-GDP ratio uses a broad definition of credit: total credit to the non-financial private 
sector (NFPS). This means that it comprises total credit to households and non-financial 
corporates, including credit from abroad. And it excludes exposures to other financial 
institutions (intra-financial lending) and public sector credit exposures. As the aim is to 
capture all sources of debt to the NFPS in a given banking system, credit from non-banks, 
debt securities issued to fund households and other non-financial private entities (including 
securitisations) is also included. 
Having calculated the credit-to-GDP ratio first, the second step is largely mechanical. It 
consists in subtracting from the observed credit-to-GDP ratio its long-term trend calculated 
with a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.12 The HP filter is a statistical technique widely used by 
researchers and analysts to separate cyclical from long-run behaviours in economic series. 
The wide use of the HP filter is one of its main attractions. It is included in most commercial 
statistical packages – including add-ins for Excel – and is easy to calculate.
But why is it necessary to subtract the credit-to-GDP trend when constructing the Basel 
gap? This is because credit-to-GDP levels are likely to vary both between countries as well 
as within the same country at different points in time for structural reasons. As a result, 
different credit-to-GDP levels are hardly comparable without an anchor. This anchor is the 
trend.13 Having this anchor is also useful when it is desired to calibrate reference values (or 
thresholds) for setting rules to determine the moment to increase or decrease the CCB. 
Conceptually, this means that there should be a sustainable or long-term credit-to-GDP 
level against which deviations from that level can be assessed empirically. These deviations 
are the ‘imbalances’ that may anticipate future materialisations of systemic risk. 
Ideally, changes in the long-term sustainable level can be assessed by using a structural 
approach, where regression analysis is applied following specifications grounded in 
economic theory. As may be expected, this route is not free of obstacles either. Empirical 
and theoretical developments on macroprudential instruments are still in a quite early 
development stage. This also helps to illustrate the advantages of applying a widely used 
tool such as the HP filter which – though purely statistical – “has withstood the test of time 
and the fire of discussion remarkably well” [Ravn and Uhlig (2002)]. For the sake of 
comparability and for the purpose of the present analysis, we follow the same statistical 
approach when exploring guiding indicators for Spain in section 4. 
Truly speaking, the HP filter defines a trend rather than extracting it from the data. The HP 
is based on an algorithm which seeks to minimise deviations of the actual series from their 
growth and changes in the trend growth rates. The weight of this second term in the 
minimisation depends on a positive and arbitrary parameter, lambda – a ‘smoothing 
parameter’ in the HP filter –. The value of lambda is set according to the data frequency. 
2.2 THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP
12  Hodrick and Prescott (1980).
13 In statistical terms, the anchor helps to make the credit-to-GDP series stationary.
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The larger the lambda, the smoother the trend obtained. As a result of these features, the 
HP, though popular, is not free from criticisms – also from a statistical point of view –.14 
A simple way to illustrate some of these criticisms is as follows. Unless a given economic 
series has absolutely no variation (i.e., it is a straight line), the algorithm is always able to 
define a cycle in the series for suitable values of lambda – even if such a cycle may actually 
not exist based on economic grounds –.15 Of course, there are common practices in the 
field to guide the values chosen for the lambda relative to the expected length of the cycle, 
and different adjustments can be introduced to improve the filter. In any case, as with any 
statistical or econometric tool, the quality of the empirical estimations is expected to 
improve substantially when they are well supported by economic analysis and tested 
against experts’ experience.16
Finally, the credit-to-GDP gap is mapped into a CCB buffer rate (ie: the ‘benchmark buffer 
rate’) by means of a simple rule built around a lower and upper threshold of gap values. 
The CCB activates when the gap is above 2 percentage points (lower threshold), the point 
from where the CCB starts increasing linearly until reaching its 2.5% maximum when the 
gap is at 10 percentage points (upper threshold). Whilst this simple rule has also been 
supported by empirical cross-country analysis – as has the gap itself – the rule is also 
meant to be used as a starting guide to authorities responsible for deciding on the CCB.
The BCBS and the ESRB have followed an ‘early warning approach’ to assess the empirical 
properties of the Basel gap and other potential indicators used to guide decisions on the 
buffer [e.g., BCBS (2010); and in the EU context, Behn et al. (2013); and Detken et al.
(2014)]. This means that – motivated by the CCB’s objective – the empirical performance 
of the indicators has been assessed in terms of their ability to predict (or forecast) systemic 
banking crises. 
As a result of this analysis, the credit-to-GDP gap has been proposed as the indicator to 
be taken as a starting reference point for assessing and setting appropriate buffer rates. 
But empirical analysis on the CCB has also shown that the baseline specification for the 
credit-to-GDP gap may not work in all cases and may benefit from some fine-tuning 
adjustments in certain contexts, and that the decisions on the CCB can be enhanced with 
other indicators and information.17 Consequently, using additional quantitative indicators 
– including alternative specifications for the Basel gap – and qualitative information is also 
recommended. This is pointed out, for instance, in Principle 2 – “Common reference guide” – 
of the BCBS principles underpinning the role of judgement in the CCB decisional framework 
(see Appendix 1). 
The ESRB own empirical work has shown that the credit-to-GDP gap is the best single 
indicator for the EU as a whole for signalling the activation of the CCB [ESRB (2014a); 
Detken et al. (2014)]. Yet, the ESRB have also found that the gap does not perform well in 
2.3  GUIDING INDICATORS 
IN THE EU
14  Ahumada and Garegnani (1999).
15  Other common criticisms include ‘end-point’ problems (instability of the filter at the end of the sample) and the 
fact that it is not a fully forward-looking metric. 
16  For further implications of using the HP filter for the credit-to-GDP calculations, see also Edge and Meisenzahl (2011).
17  Since the CCB was launched, a prolific stream of literature has emerged assessing the performance of the 
Basel gap and other indicators both at the country and EU level. For example, in addition to other empirical 
studies already mentioned for the EU, Kelly et al. (2013) examine the performance of the gap in Ireland; Kauko 
(2012) presents an analysis for Finland and a cross-section of EU countries; Bonfim and Monteiro (2013) for 
Portugal; Gerdrup et al. (2013) for Norway; Giese et al. (2014) for the UK; and Geršl and Seidler (2011) for a 
sample of central and eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic.
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some countries for a number of reasons – as for instance, structural issues –. The ESRB 
recommendation on the CCB therefore suggests that, additionally to the Basel gap, some 
countries may also want to apply alternative methodologies or specifications for the gap 
calculations and for the rule to calculate buffer rates. The recommendation however does 
not provide guidance on these alternative methodologies as it explains that the empirical 
analysis is not sufficiently developed. 
To facilitate communication with the public, national authorities should publish quarterly 
on their websites the ‘standardised’ credit-to-GDP gap and buffer rates (i.e., the Basel gap 
and buffer rates) alongside those alternative calculations of the credit-to-GDP gap and the 
corresponding buffer rate that best reflect their national specificities. This information will 
accompany the rest of the information required by the CRR/CRDIV for the announcement 
of the CCB rate each quarter – e.g., the date from which banks should apply any increases 
in the CCB rate –.18 
Further to standardised gap and alternative specifications, the ESRB recommendation 
suggests another group of quantitative indicators which – in addition to qualitative 
information – may also help to guide the activation and release of the CCB. For the activation 
phase, the following indicators have been found informative for signalling the build-up of 
system-wide risks related to excessive credit growth:
— Measures of potential overvaluation of property prices. E.g., commercial and 
residential real estate price-to-income ratios, price gaps and growth rates.
— Measures of credit developments. E.g., real total credit or real bank credit 
growth, the deviation from trend in deflated M3.
— Measures of external imbalances. E.g., current account balances as a ratio 
to GDP.
— Measures of the strength of bank balance sheets. E.g., leverage ratios.
— Measures of private sector debt burden. E.g., debt-service to income ratios.
— Measures of potential mispricing of risk. E.g., real equity price growth.
— Measures derived from models that combine the credit-to-GDP gap and a 
selection of the above measures (i.e., combined or aggregated indicators).
On quantitative indicators for the release phase, ESRB empirical findings suggest that 
financial market prices are useful to indicate a prompt reduction or full release of the CCB 
when risks materialise. However, the ESRB recommendation explains that the empirical 
analysis of indicators for signalling the release phase has been less robust than for the 
activation phase due to data limitations – e.g., limited long-time series available –. The ESRB 
has also found it difficult to identify indicators to guide a progressive reduction of the CCB 
when risks from excessive credit growth do not materialise but gradually recede. As a 
result, the ESRB expects greater usage of judgement in the release phase of the CCB than 
during its activation phase. The ESRB suggests that this judgement could also be informed 
by market intelligence, supervisory assessments and stress tests. 
18  Art. 136 (7) of the CRDIV.
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Having considered all these issues, the ESRB suggests monitoring the following indicators 
when having to decide on maintaining, reducing or fully releasing the CCB:
— Measures of stress in bank funding markets. E.g., the LIBOR-OIS (overnight 
index swaps) spread, bank CDS (credit default swap) premia.
— Measures that indicate general systemic stress. E.g., a composite indicator 
measuring stress in the national or EU financial system such as the ECB CISS 
(Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress) indicator.19 
The ESRB recommendation provides that if the aforementioned complementary indicators 
for the activation and release of the CCB are available and relevant in member states, 
national authorities should publish quarterly on their website at least one of the indicators 
for the activation phase and one for the release phase in addition to the rest of the 
information described above. 
The deadline for the follow-up of the ESRB recommendation on the CCB is 30 June 2016. 
National authorities are requested by that time to send to the ESRB, the EU Council and the EU 
Commission a report explaining the measures taken to comply with the ESRB recommendation. 
If a country decides to activate the CCB ahead of that date, all the recommended measures 
should apply from the date by which the country requires its credit institutions to maintain 
a CCB.
The CCB requirement to work countercyclically implies that it should increase at the pace that 
risks to financial stability from excessive credit growth accumulate. This occurs during what 
is known as the activation, accumulation or build-up phase. Following this first phase the 
CCB should be promptly reduced in the case of a banking crisis, or be progressively released 
when risks to financial stability recede. This is the deactivation, disaccumulation or release 
phase. In this paper we explore the performance of a set of potential guiding indicators for 
the CCB in three periods of stress in the Spanish banking sector.20 As mentioned before, the 
focus is on the build-up phase of excessive credit growth ahead of the identified events.
The first period (1978Q1-1985Q3) and the third period (2009Q2-2013Q4) that we considered 
correspond to two systemic crises episodes in the Spanish banking system. The second 
period (1993Q3-1994Q3), by contrast, corresponds to an idiosyncratic event coinciding 
with the intervention and subsequent resolution of one large bank in Spain at that time, 
Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto).
The 1978-1985 crisis (the ‘late 70’s crisis’) was the longest banking crisis and with highest 
costs in terms of GDP foregone in Spanish history thus far. It followed the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system, the oil shock and the deep recessionary period which 
characterised the early 70s in western economies. In Spain, the crisis affected a very large 
part of its banking system, including both small and large institutions. Martín-Aceña et al. 
(2013) estimate that around 52% of Spanish institutions were affected by the crisis.
The second event (the ‘Banesto crisis’) that we use for the empirical analysis is a relatively 
short stress period between 1993 and 1994 when one of the oldest and larger Spanish 
3  Stress events: the 
late 70’s crisis, 
the Banesto crisis 
and the recent crisis 
19  Holló et al. (2012).
20  For further details on the events considered see Martín-Aceña et al. (2013), Laeven and Valencia (2012), and 
Malo de Molina and Martín-Aceña (2011).
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banks – Banesto – was put into resolution, recapitalised and then sold in a public offering. 
Though this episode cannot be considered strictly as a systemic banking crisis, i.e., it 
does not fulfil the commonly used criteria to define systemic banking crises in the literature, 
we include the Banesto crisis in the exercise as it may still be useful to analyse the 
performance of the indicators in different types of stress episodes. Furthermore, as 
suggested by Davis and Karim (2008), there is no unique variable to define banking crises 
and a degree of subjectivity is usually needed.21 
Finally, the third stress event (the “recent crisis”) corresponds to the latest financial crises 
which affected most of the financial systems around the world. As is well known by now, 
this financial crisis has been one of the deepest and most widespread in history. For the 
purpose of the empirical exercise, we date at mid-2009 the beginning of this third crisis 
period in Spain. This date coincides with the intervention of the Caja de Ahorros de 
Castilla-La Mancha (CCM) by the Banco de España. This was the first institution intervened 
during the recent crisis. Furthermore, the end-2013 reference point corresponds to the 
conclusion of the financial assistance programme agreed with the European authorities in 
2012 for the recapitalisation of a portion of Spanish banks.22 
Having defined three stress events, we explore in what follows the performance of a 
number of indicators to help guide buffer decisions. We divide the selected indicators into 
five categories: Basel gap, credit developments, real estate property prices, external 
imbalances, and private sector debt sustainability. We have selected these indicators 
based on their conceptual relevance and their empirical qualities. 
Conceptually, all these indicators capture different aspects explaining the build-up of 
system-wide risks associated with credit expansions ahead of banking crises: relaxation 
of credit constraints, increased leverage of borrowers, appreciation of credit-financed 
assets and insufficient internal savings. In that sense, they are not necessarily specific to 
only one particular crisis. On the contrary, these are indicators – for example that for real 
estate – whose relevance has also been well documented in other banking crises in the 
past and in different countries. The indicators are sometimes related and can mutually 
reinforce each other, but they do not need to signal a warning simultaneously in all cases.
From an empirical perspective, given the exploratory nature of this paper and the focus on 
the build-up phase, the main broad features we would ideally require of the indicators if 
they are to be considered ‘useful’ complements to the Basel gap are twofold: i) indicators 
should peak only in advance of the stress events identified – otherwise, they would tend to 
send ‘false signals’ regarding potential stress events –; ii) the peaks should occur several 
quarters ahead of the stress event – to give enough time for the CCB to accumulate –. 
In addition to the five abovementioned categories, the analysis of banks’ balance sheet 
indicators can also be of interest from a macroprudential perspective. Preliminary work on 
this area (not reported in this paper) suggests that liquidity transformation metrics have good 
properties as potential leading indicators. Specifically, simple liquidity metrics – such for 
example a broad loan-to-deposit ratio – can provide useful information on the amount of 
liquidity transformation occurring ahead of stress events, potentially fuelling credit expansion 
at the aggregate level. However, this is still a developing area which is left for later work.
4  Indicators to guide 
the CCB in Spain
21  Some conventional crisis classifications which have widely used in the literature on early warning systems 
include Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
22 Banco de España (2013).
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 Finally, indicators based on equity prices and credit risk premiums can also be used to 
study possible misalignments in risk pricing which boost asset prices with an effect on 
credit growth. Data for valuation indicators – such as price-to-earnings ratios and market 
credit risk premiums – are however not readily available for the first two stress events 
considered in Spain, and therefore further analysis is needed to construct these series.
As explained above, whilst authorities in the EU should also consider other quantitative 
indicators and qualitative information, the baseline credit-to-GDP gap proposed by Basel 
is the common starting point in guiding decisions on the CCB. The BCBS and the ESRB 
propose a broad credit definition for the numerator in the Basel gap. On that basis, we 
have constructed a long time-series of households and non-financial corporations’ total 
debt in Spain starting from 1962.23 Similarly, for the denominator, the most recent GDP 
estimates are extended backwards using historical growth rates from previous statistical 
GDP bases (see details in Appendix 2).
Chart 1 shows the resulting credit-to-GDP ratio for Spain and the one-sided Hodrick-
Prescott trend (also known as recursive or real-time HP trend).24 The difference between 
the ratio and the trend will thus deliver the ‘real time’ Basel gap. That is, the gap which 
should have been considered at each point in time in the past, had the current regulation 
been in place. The three stress events identified above (the two systemic crises and the 
idiosyncratic event), are also shown as shaded areas in the Chart. 
The credit-to-GDP ratio shows an upward trend before the three stress events. The Basel 
gap, however, would have failed to signal the first two events. This is clearer in Chart 2 
which shows the Basel gap and the lower and upper thresholds. The CCB would have 
been zero (the gap is below the lower threshold) both in the run-up to the late 70s crisis 
and in the Banesto crisis. This means that, in the hypothetical case that the CCB were 
exclusively guided by the gap, the CCB would have not accumulated in the run-up to 
these two stress events. Alternative definitions of the debt-to-GDP gap do not alter this 
conclusion, although a gap in percentage terms (i.e., in deviations from the trend as a 
percentage of the trend), instead of in absolute differences, produces smaller fluctuations 
in the latter part of the sample, which seems desirable (see Appendix 3).
4.1  BASEL GAP
23  Although there is some debate on whether inter-company loans should be included or not, here we decided to 
include them. We did this in an attempt to simplify calculations and make the results more comparable across 
countries, as separate data on inter-company loans are not always available in other countries.
24  See Stock and Watson (1999).
CREDIT TO GDP IN SPAIN  CHART 1
SOURCES: Banco de España, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and own calculations. 
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The HP filter is a statistical procedure designed to analyse cyclical time-series with slowly 
changing long-term trends. It thus requires, first, at least one complete credit cycle to 
correctly identify the trend. And second – as with most statistical tools – the filter has 
problems in dealing with structural changes in the long-term trend or in the series level. 
On the first of these issues (complete credit cycles), having used data for Spain since 1962 
– which is already quite a long time span – it would be necessary to wait until around the 
mid-1980s to describe a full credit cycle. Over the years before the late-1970s banking 
crisis, the credit-to-GDP ratio almost doubled, suggesting a very fast pace of credit 
growth. Yet, due to the absence of historical data for the period before (and after) the 
expansionary phase, the one-sided HP gap did not signal this period as an unsustainable 
development associated with excessive credit growth.25 Afterwards, during the 80s and 
90s, the credit-to-GDP ratio stopped growing and even declined somewhat, but did not 
return to the early-1960s levels, indicating that part of the increase was structural or 
sustainable. As a consequence of the delayed reaction in the trend, the one-sided HP gap 
remained negative for a long period after the start of the 1978-1985 crisis. Thus, by the 
time of the next stress event (in 1993-1994), the trend was still too high, contributing to 
explain the absence of any warning signal in advance.
Regarding the second issue (structural changes), the evidence shows some sharp changes 
in the long-term trends by the end of the 90s in Spain. These changes create some hurdles 
for the functioning of the CCB ahead of the recent crisis. The trend for the Basel gap is 
backward looking. It thus only feeds on historical data and adjusts only very gradually to 
new structural developments, especially at high values of the smoothing parameter 
lambda. The Basel gap in this case would have started signalling symptoms of excessive 
credit growth since mid-1998 and it would have very rapidly implied a 2.5% CCB since 
25  As during previous years there was a continuous upward trend in the ratio, the filter ‘memory’ assumes this 
trend will also continue in the future. Thus, a stabilisation in the ratio generates a negative gap during some 
years until the filter ‘learns’ there has been a change in the trend. Arguably, a two-sided HP filter augmented 
with forecasts may help to get more precise estimates of the trend and its possible changes [see Gerdrup et al. 
(2013)]. This is because a two-sided HP filter uses all available information – possibly also including forecasted 
data – rather than just vintage information as in the one-sided filter. However, this approach would rely on the 
ability to capture the underlying economic developments in the series. In general, purely statistical methods do 
not produce good forecasts when there is insufficient data or when facing structural changes.
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BASELINE BASEL GAP AND THRESHOLDS. APPLICATION TO SPAIN CHART 2
SOURCES: Banco de España, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and own calculations.
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end-1999 (see Chart 2). This is ten years in advance of the 2009-2013 banking crisis. 
Moreover, from mid-2004 the gap became really high (above 25), suggesting even higher 
CCB levels in the years immediately before the crisis. Thus, the doubts are as to whether 
the gap may have been sending signals far too early in this case. 
On the one hand, this would have been the case if, for instance as a result of Spain joining 
the euro area, the ‘sustainable’ debt-to-GDP ratio had increased. The HP trend fails to fully 
assess what could be a sustainable or equilibrium credit-to-GDP. From this perspective, 
therefore, at least part of the credit growth observed from the mid-1990s to 2007 would 
not be seen as a signal of excessive credit supply, but rather as an adjustment to a new 
equilibrium (a structural change). Some support for this hypothesis can be found in the fact 
that the level of credit-to-GDP in Spain during the 80s and 90s (below 100%) was relatively 
low when compared to the level of financial intermediation in other advanced economies. 
On the other hand, it should also be recognised that structural changes are difficult to 
assess in real time. Given the perils of underestimating procyclical risk during expansionary 
periods and in the absence of better a knowledge of the structural determinants of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio – or more generally on the sustainable size for different banking systems 
and business models – a carefully balanced policy is warranted.26 
The type of dynamics just described may also be illustrative for other countries which did not 
suffer such a marked change in the credit-to-GDP trend as did Spain in the late 90s, but were 
still ‘cycling’, along their historical series, with a relatively steep credit-to-GDP trend beyond 
what could be considered as sustainable. When applied in these scenarios, the Basel gap is 
less likely to signal excessive credit growth processes – even though systemic risks may 
actually be hatching and developing underneath –. This can occur for the same reason as that 
responsible for the gap failing to send signals ahead of the late 70s crisis in Spain. 
Similar situations may also occur in the coming years. But now because of the strong 
credit-to-GDP growth experienced ahead of the recent crisis. This difficulty is illustrated in 
Chart 3 using two arbitrary simulations of the future behaviour of the ratio. These 
simulations assume that part of the large increase observed in the first decade of this 
century was an overreaction. Consequently, the credit-to-GDP ratio would fluctuate in the 
future around a somewhat lower level. However, due to the ‘memory’ of the HP trend, it 
would take quite some time for it to adjust to the new equilibrium level, making it more 
difficult to identify potential future excesses in credit growth with the Basel gap. In the 
absence of other indicators – for example on the intensity of credit growth – or sound 
estimates of sustainable credit-to-GDP levels, a comparison of the two simulations shows 
that this kind of issues can impair to some extent the gap’s ability to identify future 
expansionary periods – for example in a hypothetical and at the moment still unlikely 
scenario of a very intense credit expansion in the next few years –.27 
Solving these issues is challenging, but they are not new. For example, similar problems 
arise when estimating potential output to be used in output gap estimations. There are at 
least three strategies which could be followed to try to alleviate these problems. First, 
using a broad set of complementary indicators – as for example also suggested in Giese 
26  ESRB (2014b) provides some first insights and discussion on the size of the European banking system, but 
further work in this very challenging area is much needed. 
27  This would also be the case even if we assume there is not an overreaction in the credit-to-GDP growth observed 
in the first decade of this century. Simply a change in the trend, from the steep upward sloping one observed up 
to 2009 to a flatter one, would be enough to generate statistical problems for the one-sided HP gap. 
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et al. (2014) – can help to unmask possible sources of systemic risk associated with 
excessive credit growth. These indicators include metrics on credit growth intensity such as 
the ratio of changes in credit to cumulated GDP proposed in the next section, which could 
complement metrics focused on the amount of excesses such as the Basel gap. Second, 
econometric estimations of long-term equilibrium levels for the credit-to-GDP ratio can 
help to inform on structural factors affecting credit developments. The econometric 
estimates, in turn, should benefit to a great extent from progress made in treating financial 
stability issues in general equilibrium models. Finally, other different methodologies and 
approaches – for example, stress-tests – can be also used to identify relevant endogenous 
and exogenous factors when guiding buffer decisions.
Given the CCB’s objectives, it is clear that credit developments are crucial to guide the 
buffer. The relevant issue is to what extent they are important and informative beyond what 
is already included in the credit-to-GDP gap. 
For example, Repullo and Saurina (2011) report a negative correlation between the Basel 
gap and GDP growth, which would make the gap questionable as a countercyclical 
indicator. As an alternative, therefore, they propose using credit growth as the 
macroeconomic variable driving the behaviour of the CCB. 
The negative correlation between the gap and GDP growth is likely to be most relevant during 
recessions or following a crisis, when a fall in GDP typically materialises sooner than a fall in 
credit, making the credit-to-GDP a less effective indicator when deciding on the right moment 
to release the CCB [see Kauko (2012) and Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014)]. Consequently, 
as suggested in the BCBS (2010) and ESRB (2014a) guiding documents, complementary 
indicators to signal the release of the buffer may be needed. Although assessing indicators for 
the release phase is still a developing area and beyond the scope of this paper, GDP growth 
and ‘fast moving’ indicators such as equity prices or credit default swap (CDS) premiums have 
been found to be promising guiding indicators [see for example Detken et al. (2014)]. 
During credit booms, a general tendency for credit to grow faster than GDP would be 
expected. This makes the gap more likely to send the right activation signals during these 
periods when risks are building up. Nonetheless, possible conflicts between the business 
(GDP) and credit cycle may still arise. This is pointing in two directions in our view. First, in 
addition to monitoring the credit-to-GDP gap, there are reasons for tracking credit 
4.2 CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS
 CREDIT-TO-GDP RATIO  HP RECURSIVE TREND  SIMULATION 1  SIMULATION 2 
ARBITRARY EXAMPLE OF SIMULATED CREDIT TO GDP GAP IN SPAIN CHART 3 
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developments which can be captured by complementary credit-based indicators, such as 
for instance credit growth measures or the variant we propose further below, namely the 
ratio of changes in credit to cumulated GDP. And second, there is a need to not lose sight 
of the ongoing interrelationships between the credit and business cycles to guard against 
a conflict between them arising at some point.
Let us focus on the first point, additional credit-based indicators. For the construction of 
these additional indicators, we use as the credit metric the same metric as for the numerator 
of the credit-to-GDP ratio. This means we include total debt from households and non-
financial corporations in Spain (see Chart 4).
Real credit growth should be a good signal when lenders are underestimating risks and 
consequently credit is growing steadily and rapidly over time. In fact, in the three identified 
pre-crisis periods in Spain, the annual growth of debt was above its long-term average for 
at least some quarters. And this was more so in the cases of the two most serious crises 
(the first and third ones). However, this indicator shows too much volatility, which could be 
alleviated by some form of smoothing (e.g., moving average). 
A possible alternative is what we have called a “credit intensity” indicator, defined as the 
annual change in non-financial private-sector debt divided by four-quarter cumulated 
GDP. This measure is included among the indicators to follow in the EU Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and gives an idea to what extent expenditure in the economy 
is being supported by new credit. Therefore, a high value of the indicator should point to 
unsustainable expenditure levels. Also important, after the proposed transformations, 
both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio are now capturing annual flows. 
More specifically, there is some conceptual attraction in combining credit-based indicators 
capturing ‘excess’ credit in terms of domestic economic resources (proxied by GDP) and 
long-term values (proxied by a trend), with credit-based indicators capturing the ‘intensity’ 
(or velocity) of the build-up of credit excesses – such as for example the ratio of changes in 
credit to cumulated GDP proposed above –. Note that – from an economic point of view – 
changes in credit could also be interpreted as a proxy for that part of consumption and 
investment that households and non-financial corporations are getting financed. Absent 
structural changes, this part should be a stable proportion of their income (GDP) in a 
model of balanced growth. 
 DEMEANED REAL GROWTH RATE  CREDIT INTENSITY  LOG REAL DEBT (right-hand scale) 
TOTAL DEBT OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN CHART 4
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Moreover, the suggested approach could help to detect rapid credit growth processes 
which may still not produce large deviations with respect to the trend; cases where 
excesses accumulate during long time periods, at a slow but steady pace; and more 
perilous cases where credit excesses accumulate very rapidly in few years.
Chart 4 shows that the ‘credit intensity’ indicator peaks well ahead of the three-identified 
events, with a very marked increase from the beginning of 2004. Although it is difficult to 
say with certainty, it appears there is no long-term trend in this measure (i.e., it is stationary) 
and therefore thresholds values for guiding the CCB accumulation could eventually be 
calibrated without using any statistical filter.28 As an illustration, a 15% level was not 
exceeded in the period before the 1993-94 crisis, but it was ahead of the other two (from 
1972Q3 and 1999Q2, respectively). A more conservative 10% level would have also 
signaled the intermediate crisis from 1988Q3. These insights are confirmed when zooming 
in at the three-year period prior to the stress events identified in Spain (Chart 5).
It is well-known by now that a combination of strong growth in credit and in property prices 
is a clear early-warning signal of potential systemic banking crises [see for example, Borio 
and Drehmann (2009), Barrel et al. (2010) and Behn et al. (2013)]. Both variables tend to 
move in tandem because of the role of credit in supporting house purchases and the role 
of housing wealth (as collateral) in decisions on loan supply. Hence, unusually high property 
prices or rapid increases in them can be a signal confirming the existence of excessive 
credit growth. And, at the same time, they point to additional sources of systemic risks 
since those elevated property prices may be unsustainable.
Chart 6 shows three potential indicators to assess developments in the real estate sector 
in Spain: real house prices, price-to-income ratio and price-to-rent ratio for Spain. 
Real house prices grew strongly ahead of all the identified stress events and fell afterwards, 
suggesting this is an informative indicator for guiding CCB activation. However, they also 
show a long-term upward trend. This trend should thus be removed to get an appropriate 
signal for the CCB. Normalising house prices using housing rents as denominator is 
4.3  REAL ESTATE PROPERTY 
PRICES 
28  Simplicity is always an advantage in regulation, as put it by Calomiris (2012): “Only simple rules can avoid 
dependence on regulatory discretion, which is subject to political manipulation; automatically enforced, 
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however not very useful in Spain as it fails to remove the observed trend (see the price-to-
rent ratio in the Chart 6). This is probably because of the nature of the Spanish rental 
market, which is quite small and has been subject to important regulatory restrictions on 
prices.29 All this makes housing rents a poor indicator of fundamental house prices. 
The results are somewhat better when adjusting for potential GDP per capita (price-to-
income ratio). Nonetheless, there is still an upward trend in prices, which suggests the 
existence of other fundamental factors (and/or structural changes) affecting the long-term 
sustainable price level. Ideally, a structural analysis could be carried out in order to obtain 
a more accurate indicator for the CCB. However, for the sake of comparison, we will follow 
the same non-structural approach we have already used for previous indicators. We thus 
use growth rates and detrended series with the HP filter (see Chart 7).
Gap measures tend to perform better than growth rates.30 The latter are more volatile, go 
higher earlier in the expansion and decline sometimes well ahead of the actual crisis, 
making it difficult to extract a specific level above which the CCB could be activated.
REAL HOUSE PRICES  PRICE-TO-INCOME  PRICE-TO-RENT 
HOUSE PRICE DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN CHART 6
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29 For example, between 1970 and 1979, real rents fell by 33%, in a context of high inflation and regulated rents.
30  The growth rate is also demeaned by subtracting the average growth rate for the whole period.
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The one-sided HP gap (ie: the ‘real time’ gap) does not work in the first stress event, but 
this is mainly due to a lack of enough historical data for that period.31 In the other two 
events it works properly. As an example, a 5% threshold would have resulted in an 
activation and gradual accumulation of the CCB by 1987Q4 and 2001Q1, respectively.32 
The same pattern is also clear in Chart 8. 
An explanation for the better behavior of the HP filter in this case, compared to the credit-to-
GDP analysis above, is that real house prices appear not to show abrupt changes in long-
term trends (compare Charts 1 and 6). This makes it more likely that the procedure will also 
work in the future, although it cannot be ruled out that this will fail to hold if there are future 
structural changes. Structural models of house prices will also be needed in that case.
It is worth mentioning two additional aspects. First, real house prices, including their gap 
transformations, tend to decline ahead of the identified systemic banking crises, theoretically 
pointing to a release of the CCB. This may or may not be optimal, but it has to be analysed 
in the context of the indicators for the release of the CCB, which are distinct from those 
applicable to its build-up. Second, the house price gap fails to identify the severity of the 
subsequent crisis. The maximum level of the gap is similar ahead of the 1993-1994 and 
2009-2013 stress events, whereas the severity of these two crises, in terms of financial 
sector turmoil and real sector implications, was quite different. Notice that, housing prices 
only are not able to capture other risks which can accumulate during expansions on the 
‘real side’ – for example excessive growth in residential construction –. As such, indicators 
based on housing prices can be used to confirm or complement messages from other 
indicators capturing the real side of the expansionary period, as for example the gap itself. 
Yet again, as per other indicators, information from other sources of qualitative and 
quantitative information should help to get a complete picture of the issue. 
Despite the limitations described above, real estate price indicators show very good 
qualities as a complement to the Basel gap. The real time gap estimations clearly pick up 
31  This is confirmed when a two-sided HP filter is applied instead of the one-sided one in the gap calculation. The 
gap using a two-sided filter would also pick up the first stress-event. The two-sided filter, by using all available 
information rather than just vintage information as in the one-sided, overcomes the lack of data at the beginning 
of the series in this case. Yet, as explained before, the one-sided filter is used in this the paper as it simulates 
policy decisions when they would actually be made in real time. 
32 With a 10% threshold those dates would have been 1988Q1 and 2001Q4.
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the two stress-events identified for which enough data is available. The dynamics preceding 
the last two events were also similar to those observed in the run up to first stress event 
(i.e., rapid growth in house prices). This suggests that these indicators would have also 
sent correct informative signals during that period. 
The indicators analysed above capture directly the behaviour of credit or are closely linked 
to it. Other promising indicators for the purpose of signalling excessive credit growth 
periods are those that indirectly react to it. In that respect, it has been generally observed 
that when credit grows well above GDP, consumption and investment increase, and 
domestically generated savings are not enough to finance the credit expansion. As a 
result, resources have to be ‘imported’ from abroad and this is recorded in the balance of 
payments as a deficit in the current account. For this reason, the current account balance 
of the economy as a whole can be a useful leading indicator of financial distress, notably 
when deficits of a certain size are recorded over a sustained time period. Following this 
rationale, we include external imbalances and international capital flows in our analysis. 
Assessing these aspects is particularly important for a country like Spain, where most of 
these flows are intermediated by the banking sector. 
Chart 9 shows that taking into consideration external imbalance indicators is indeed 
relevant for Spain. The stress events identified were preceded by a sustained current 
account deficit of around 4% of GDP. It should be noted, besides, that this ratio fluctuates 
around a stable level, so, as with the credit intensity indicator, no statistical or economic 
transformation of the indicator is needed – at least in this first approach – to assess its 
usefulness as a complementary guiding indicator for the CCB. 
There were other two periods when the current account deficit stood at 4% for a certain 
period of time (1980-1984 and 2000-2003). But during 1980-1984 the late 70s crisis was 
still ongoing. And in 2000-2003, the process ended up five years later in the recent crisis 
after having reached deficits at around 10% of GDP. 
It should also be remarked that sources of the observed current account deficits were very 
different. In the 70s the oil price shocks played a leading role; in the 90s not enough saving 
was the key; and in the 2000s excessive investment in the real estate sector was at the 
heart of the observed events. Also, the commercial and financial openness in Spain was 
very different in each case. However, in all the cases considered a stress event was 
recorded some time later. 
4.4  EXTERNAL IMBALANCES
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE IN SPAIN CHART 9 
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The aforementioned behavior of the current account balance around the the time of stress 
events identified is well reflected in Chart 10. Current account deficits over 4% are 
observed well in advance of the stress, and they remain in that mode for a sustained 
period. As a result, the current account balance sent informative signals ahead of the three 
stress-events identified and its dynamics are also consistent with the concepts underlying 
this indicator.
Borrowers’ debt levels have been found to be pivotal factors explaining the recent financial 
crisis. For example, Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) describe the importance of the household 
debt and household balance sheet channel in the US crisis. In this regard, metrics capturing 
excessive private sector debt – such as for instance the debt-to-income and debt service 
ratios – have also been widely supported in the recent literature on guiding indicators for 
the CCB [see for example, Drehmann and Juselius (2012, 2014); Detken et al. (2014); 
Giese et al. (2014)]. Consistently with these findings, the ESRB recommendation on the 
CCB includes a category on measures of private sector debt burden for authorities to be 
considered when assessing quantitative information for the build-up phase. 
Measures of debt expenditures and income capture the burden imposed by higher debt in 
terms of available resources on the demand side of credit. Higher levels of these ratios are 
associated with less sustainable debt dynamics and thus higher probabilities of default. 
Different perceptions or estimations on these risk factors can in turn boost credit availability 
in good times and credit constraints in bad times. All told, fluctuations in real estate prices 
and different levels of private sector debt play an important role in the behaviour of credit.
The Basel gap has already embedded in its design some notions on credit sustainability. 
First, credit is assessed in terms of economic resources at a given point in time which is 
captured by the GDP. Second, the credit-to-GDP ratio is assessed in terms of its trend 
value. From this perspective, the indicators explored in this section can be seen as 
refinements to the information on credit sustainability embedded in the Basel gap. Key 
factors explaining credit sustainability are interest rates and debt maturity. These factors 
are jointly explored as part of a ‘debt burden’ ratio.33 
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33  On the usefulness of the debt service ratio as an early warning indicator of systemic banking crises, see 
Drehmann and Juselius (2012, 2014).
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The Basel gap provides a view on the indebtedness of the non-financial private sector. 
However, while debt is an inter-temporal concept – in the sense that debt maturity is 
usually higher than one quarter – the GDP is the income generated in one quarter. In this 
respect, the ratio may miss some information on the income drain due to the debt load in 
a specific period. This drain could act as a default trigger. 
The share of income devoted to debt reimbursements can be divided into two parts. The 
first is the payment of accrued interest; the second is the fraction of debt principal that is 
repaid. As debt burden metrics incorporate information on interest rate and debt maturity, 
they can be used as comprehensive indicators of agents’ financial conditions. This is 
valuable information, as interest rate payments are a determinant of debt sustainability 
and, traditionally, lower maturity is associated with higher vulnerabilities.
To our knowledge, there are no official statistical sources on an aggregate basis containing 
this information; these indicators thus have to be constructed from partial metrics. In 
particular, we calculate a debt burden (db) as in the following expression:34
[1]
Where i is the outstanding debt interest rate, D is the total credit analyzed before, m is the 
debt maturity and Y is private agents’ disposable income. The numerator of the first term 
captures accrued interest and the denominator the debt principal repaid. The second term is 
just the debt-to-income ratio (including interest payments, since disposable income 
discounts these payments). These ratios are calculated separately for households and 
non-financial corporations, using their respective disposable incomes. When they are 
aggregated, the GDP is the denominator of the ratio. As Chart 11 shows, the debt burden 
for the non-financial private sector hovers around 14% of GDP until the mid-2000s. It 
then increases considerably before the recent banking crisis and diminishes afterwards 
– although it is still above the previous levels –. Notice that this indicator also rebounded 
before the mid-90s crisis, but not in the 70s crisis. In fact, unlike in the other two crises the 
debt burden increased during that crisis. 
This general aggregate profile is repeated in the two sectors but with two major differences 
between households and non-financial firms. First, the debt burden level for firms is much 
higher than that for households. This is a consequence of assuming that the outstanding 
debt will be repaid using exclusively out of disposable income. However, debtors can also 
sell assets or refinance their debt. This is probably the case for non-financial firms, as debt 
not only finances investment projects but also day-to-day activities. The second difference 
is that households’ burden debt presents more inertia, probably as a consequence of a 
higher debt maturity. 
A difficulty with this indicator is that it is influenced by the business cycle through its 
effects on disposable income and interest rates.35 Yet, as debt is an inter-temporal concept, 
we should consider a cyclically-free concept for income and interest rates. Besides, there 
is some evidence showing that business and credit cycles reinforce each other. We would 
thus favour calculating a debt service ratio based on potential disposable income (derived 
34  This expression is slightly different from that of Drehmann and Juselius (2012) as the denominator of this 
expression also includes interest payments. Note that disposable income of households and non-financial 
corporations is net of these payments.
35  On the effects of monetary policy on risk taking and credit supply see Jiménez et al. (2012, 2014).
db t = [1 – (1 + i t ) 
– m t ] (Y t + i t D t )
i t D t
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from potential GDP)36 and natural interest rate.37 Chart 12 shows the results when using 
these inputs. 
The indicators for all sectors are very similar to the previous ones assessed, but they also 
show some improvements. First, now the ratios tend to fluctuate more closely around a 
stable mean. Second, for the three sectors considered the indicator reached a peak before 
each of the three stress events. The observed increase before the nineties is a minor one, 
and in line with the non-systemic nature of this stress event. Finally, in all cases a decline 
is observed just before the stress event, which suggests these indicators may also be of 
some help for the release phase. 
The informative value of the debt burden indicator can also be checked in Chart 13 for the 
non-financial private sector. The debt burden ratio is always above the level observed in 
the first quarter of the stress events, although only in the last crisis does the deviation 
appear to be of some size. All in all, as with the three previous categories of indicators 
36  Potential disposable income is obtained smoothing the observed ratio of disposable income over GDP and 
multiplying by potential GDP.
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SOURCES: Banco de España, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and own calculations. 
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considered (credit developments, property prices and external imbalances), the indicators 
of private debt sustainability peak ahead of the stress events identified and do not appear 
to be sending significant wrong signals.
Sound policy rules are very much needed to ensure predictability and avoid time 
inconsistency problems. Yet designing and implementing simple, comparable and effective 
countercyclical policy rules are not easy jobs. This has also been the case for fiscal and 
monetary policy for example. Macroprudential policy is not an exception, particularly given 
the still-incipient knowledge of this field. 
EU legislation requires setting a countercyclical capital buffer starting on the basis of the 
credit-to-GDP gap (as defined in Basel) and complementing it with other specifications or 
indicators if needed. Drawing on empirical evidence in Spain we suggest a number of 
issues to be kept in mind when applying this benchmark guide. In particular, a fully 
automatic application of the credit-to-GDP gap has limitations when dealing with 
incomplete credit cycles and in the presence of structural changes in the data. The 
consequences of these issues can be observed when analysing how well the gap would 
have performed in the past. But these consequences are also relevant for the future as 
some simple simulations show. Further work on equilibrium estimations and more fleshed-
out theoretical models, for example, should help to alleviate these issues in the future. 
In the meantime, a broad but still manageable set of complementary indicators in 
conjunction with the credit-to-GDP gap can serve as useful ‘sign posts’ to guide buffer 
decisions. Conceptually, all the indicators analysed in this paper capture different factors 
explaining the build-up of system-wide risks associated with credit expansions ahead of 
banking crises (relaxation of credit constraints, increased leverage of borrowers, 
appreciation of credit-financed assets and insufficient internal savings), whose effects the 
CCB aims to alleviate. The selected indicators are sometimes related and can mutually 
reinforce each other, but they are not necessarily specific to just one particular crisis. From 
an empirical perspective, suitable indicators in all the categories considered sent 
informative signals ahead of the stress events identified in Spain. And their maximums 
tended to occur several quarters ahead of those events. 
More specifically, we find that indicators of ‘credit intensity’, such as the one proposed in 
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to metrics capturing ‘credit excesses’. Further, indicators of property prices (detrended 
real house prices), external imbalances (current account as a percentage of GDP) and 
private sector debt sustainability (debt burden ratio for the non-financial private sector) 
can also help to identify periods of excess credit growth associated with an increase in 
systemic risks. In the quest for simplicity, it is worth noting that no statistical transformation 
was needed for the credit intensity and the current account balance indicators.
We hope that, despite differences in countries’ historical data and the very rapid 
developments in the financial sector, this analysis will also be useful in other contexts and 
in the future. 
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Basel principles:
— Objective: Buffer decisions should be guided by the objectives to be achieved 
by the buffer, namely to protect the banking system against potential future 
losses when excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-
wide risk.
— Common reference guide: The credit/GDP guide is a useful common reference 
point in taking buffer decisions. It does not need to play a dominant role in the 
information used by authorities to take and explain buffer decisions. 
Authorities should explain the information used, and how it is taken into 
account in formulating buffer decisions.
— Risk of misleading signals: Assessments of the information contained in the 
credit/GDP guide and any other guides should be mindful of the behaviour of 
the factors that can lead them to give misleading signals.
— Prompt release: Promptly releasing the buffer in times of stress can help to 
reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by regulatory capital 
requirements.
— Other macroprudential tools: The buffer is an important instrument in a suite 
of macroprudential tools at the disposal of the authorities.
Appendix 1: 
Principles for the CCB
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Additional principles suggested by the ESRB:
— Communication: A good communication strategy for the buffer decisions 
contributes to managing public expectations plays an important role in the 
coordination mechanism between designated authorities and is essential for 
the credibility, accountability and effectiveness of macro-prudential policy. 
Transparent, stable processes and well defined channels of communication 
between authorities and key stakeholders constitute the basis of a good 
communication strategy.
— Reciprocity: Designated authorities should recognise the buffer rates applied 
in other jurisdictions, where appropriate. Designated authorities should 
consider potential cross-border implications when not recognising a buffer 
rate for exposures to another Member State and when setting or not 
recognising a buffer rate for exposures to a third country. The relevant 
designated authorities and the ESRB should be notified of these decisions.
Total debt of households and non-financial corporations
Since December 1994, it is total loans and debt securities of households and non-financial 
corporations, including inter-company loans, from the Spanish Financial Accounts according 
to SEC 2010. This data is extended backwards, up to March 1980, using growth rates 
of Financial Accounts according to SEC 1995, and up to March 1962, using growth rates of 
total bank loans to “other resident sectors”.38
Gross Domestic Product
We first construct annual series for nominal and real GDP compatible with the new 
definition of SEC-2010. The official series from the National Statistic Institute (1995-2013) 
are extended backwards using growth rates of GDP Base 2000.39 Data for the years before 
1970 is taken from the database BDMACRO from the Ministry of Finance.
Then quarterly series are obtained interpolating annual data using as indicators quarterly 
GDP Base 2000, up to 1970, and electric energy consumption and CPI, before 1970. Data 
for 2014Q1 and Q2 are extrapolated on the basis of quarterly GDP Base 2008.
Potential GDP is calculated as the simple average of: two-side HP filter with lambda 1600, 
two-side HP filter with lambda 20000, European Commission output gap and IMF output 
gap. The last two indicators are interpolated to obtain quarterly data using a two-sided HP 
filter with lambda 20000.
House prices
Since 2007, it is the Housing Price Index produced by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE).40 This data is extended backwards using growth rates of housing price statistics 
from the Ministerio de Fomento (up to 1987), house prices in the capital from Tecnigrama 
(up to 1977) and the residential investment deflator (up to 1970). Annual data series were 
Appendix 2: 
Database and sources
38  “Other resident sectors” include all residents except credit institutions and General Government.
39  Investment on R&D is estimated and added separately.
40  This is an hedonic index that adjust for changes in housing quality.
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interpolated and adjustments were made to take into account the different variability of the 
various series considered.
Housing rents
An index based on the housing rent component of CPI.
Current account balance
Since 1989 it is obtained from the Spanish Balance of Payments (2000-2014, sixth edition of the 
IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual; 1989-1999, fifth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments 
Manual) and, between 1970 and 1988, from the old methodology of balance of payments.
Average interest rate on households’ and non-financial companies’ debt
Since 2003, interest rates on outstanding amounts are taken from harmonized Eurosystem 
statistics (table 19.12 of the Statistical Bulletin of the Banco de España). Before that, they 
are derived from internal estimates of available measures on interest rates applied by 
banks on new loans.
Average maturity of households’ and non-financial companies’ debt
Average maturity of households’ and non-financial companies’ debt is obtained from the 
breakdown of debt levels by maturity in the Spanish Financial Accounts. It is assumed that 
the average maturity of short-term debt is two quarters and in the case of long-term debt, 
58 quarters for households and 46 quarters for non-financial companies. The latter 
difference reflects the fact that most long-term households’ debt has a maturity of more 
than 5 years, whereas most long-term non-financial companies’ debt has a maturity 
between 1 and 5 years. Up to 1980, average maturity is kept constant.
Disposable income of households and non-financial companies
Since 1980, these variables are taken from the database of the Banco de España´s Quarterly 
Macroeconometric Model of the Spanish Economy and extended backwards, up to 1970, 
interpolating National Accounts annual data. 
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Appendix 3: 
Alternative definitions of 
the credit-to-GDP gap
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